This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
- Type: TTP
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2020-03-02
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objectives
- CIS 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that remote_registry_key_modifications_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you must populate the
Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don’t think the logic is right.
Known False Positives
This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it’s important to filter these events out.
Associated Analytic story
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
- Windows Persistence Techniques
source | version: 3