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Description

This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to enable plain text credential feature of windows. This technique was used by several malware and also by mimikatz to be able to dumpe the a plain text credential to the compromised or target host. This TTP is really a good indicator that someone wants to dump the crendential of the host so it must be a good pivot for credential dumping techniques.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2022-01-28
  • Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
  • ID: 0c7d8ffe-25b1-11ec-9f39-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion
T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\*" Registry.registry_value_name = "UseLogonCredential" Registry.registry_value_data = 0x00000001 by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
|join proc_guid, _time [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
| `enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: enable_wdigest_uselogoncredential_registry_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Registry.dest
  • Registry.user
  • Registry.registry_value_name
  • Registry.registry_key_name
  • Registry.registry_path
  • Registry.registry_value_data

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 wdigest registry $registry_path$ was modified in $dest$

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2