This search is to detect a possible uac bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. this technique was seen in so many malware and ransomware like lockbit where it make use of the colorui.dll COM CLSID to bypass UAC.
- Type: TTP
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2021-08-13
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 10
1 2 3 4 5 `sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest parent_process_name process_name ImageLoaded signature_id signature Signed user_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.
Associated Analytic Story
|48.0||60||80||The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application $parent_process_name$ on endpoint $dest$ by user $user_id$.|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
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