Windows CAB File on Disk
Description
The following analytic detects .cab files being written to disk. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on events where the file name is '*.cab' and the action is 'write'. This activity is significant as .cab files can be used to deliver malicious payloads, including embedded .url files that execute harmful code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. Analysts should review the file path and associated artifacts for further investigation.
- Type: Anomaly
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-28
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 622f08d0-69ef-42c2-8139-66088bc25acd
Annotations
Kill Chain Phase
- Delivery
NIST
- DE.AE
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name=*.cab) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.action Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name("Filesystem")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cab_file_on_disk_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_cab_file_on_disk_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- Filesystem.dest
- Filesystem.action
- Filesystem.process_id
- Filesystem.file_name
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
False positives will only be present if a process legitimately writes a .cab file to disk. Modify the analytic as needed by file path. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
5.0 | 50 | 10 | A .cab file was written to disk on endpoint $dest$. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 2