ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control | Defense Evasion |
T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Disable UAC Remote Restriction
Description
The following analytic detects the modification of the registry to disable UAC remote restriction by setting the "LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" value to "0x00000001". It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "\CurrentVersion\Policies\System". This activity is significant because disabling UAC remote restriction can allow an attacker to bypass User Account Control (UAC) protections, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could enable an attacker to execute unauthorized actions with elevated privileges, compromising the security of the affected system.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name="LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001" ) BY Registry.user Registry.dest Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
4| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
5| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
6| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
7| `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 12 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Sysmon EventID 13 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter | search * |
disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
Known False Positives
admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$ | 80 | 80 | 100 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 7