CertUtil With Decode Argument
Description
The following analytic detects the use of CertUtil.exe with the 'decode' argument, which may indicate an attempt to decode a previously encoded file, potentially containing malicious payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving CertUtil.exe. This activity is significant because attackers often use CertUtil to decode malicious files downloaded from the internet, which are then executed to compromise the system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized code execution, further system compromise, and potential data exfiltration.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-27
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: bfe94226-8c10-11eb-a4b3-acde48001122
Annotations
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_certutil` Processes.process=*decode* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `certutil_with_decode_argument_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
certutil_with_decode_argument_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Typically seen used to encode
files, but it is possible to see legitimate use of decode
. Filter based on parent-child relationship, file paths, endpoint or user.
Associated Analytic Story
- Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
- Living Off The Land
- Forest Blizzard
- APT29 Diplomatic Deceptions with WINELOADER
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
40.0 | 50 | 80 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to decode a file. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1140/T1140.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/certutilexe-could-allow-attackers-to-download-malware-while-bypassing-av/
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 3