Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
Description
The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without any command line arguments. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires command line arguments to function properly, and its absence is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to credential dumping, unauthorized file writes, or other malicious actions.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-27
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| regex process="(?i)(rundll32\.exe.{0,4}$)"
| `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
Associated Analytic Story
- Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
- Cobalt Strike
- BlackByte Ransomware
- PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
- Graceful Wipe Out Attack
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
49.0 | 70 | 70 | Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32/
- https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 4