This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32.exe process having a http connection and do a dns query in some web domain. This technique was seen in IcedID malware where the rundll32 that execute its payload will contact amazon.com to check internet connect and to communicate to its C&C server to download config and other file component.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2022-02-18
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: f1483f5e-ee29-11eb-9d23-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 `sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="rundll32.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus ProcessId Computer | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_dnsquery_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
rundll32_dnsquery_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
Known False Positives
Associated Analytic Story
|56.0||70||80||rundll32 process $process_name$ having a dns query to $QueryName$ in host $Computer$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
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