This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications to the registry key
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. In this scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2020-11-23
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
|T1547.010||Port Monitors||Persistence, Privilege Escalation|
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`
Associated Analytic Story
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or via other endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report registry modifications.
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objectives
Known False Positives
You will encounter noise from legitimate print-monitor registry entries.
|64.0||80||80||New print monitor added on $dest$|
source | version: 2