Detection: Azure AD Tenant Wide Admin Consent Granted

Description

The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to sensitive data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.

 1`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Consent to application" 
 2| eval new_field=mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 4) 
 3| rename properties.* as *  
 4| rex field=new_field "ConsentType: (?<ConsentType>[^\,]+)" 
 5| rex field=new_field "Scope: (?<Scope>[^\,]+)"  
 6| search  ConsentType = "AllPrincipals"  
 7| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by operationName, user, targetResources{}.displayName, targetResources{}.id, ConsentType, Scope 
 8| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`  
 9| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
10| `azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Azure Active Directory Consent to application Azure icon Azure 'azure:monitor:aad' 'Azure AD'

Macros Used

Name Value
azure_monitor_aad sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad
azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter search *
azure_ad_tenant_wide_admin_consent_granted_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1098 Account Manipulation Persistence
T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
HAFNIUM
Lazarus Group
LAPSUS$
Scattered Spider

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the Auditlogs log category.

Known False Positives

Legitimate applications may be granted tenant wide consent, filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Administrator $user$ consented an OAuth application for the tenant. 45 90 50
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset Azure AD azure:monitor:aad
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset Azure AD azure:monitor:aad

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4