ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | Defense Evasion |
T1036 | Masquerading | Defense Evasion |
T1218.011 | Rundll32 | Defense Evasion |
T1036.003 | Rename System Utilities | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Suspicious Rundll32 Rename
DEPRECATED DETECTION
This detection has been marked as deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported. If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to us at research@splunk.com.
Description
The following hunting analytic identifies renamed instances of rundll32.exe executing. rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, validate it is the legitimate rundll32.exe executing and what script content it is loading. This query relies on the original filename or internal name from the PE meta data. Expand the query as needed by looking for specific command line arguments outlined in other analytics.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.original_file_name=RUNDLL32.exe AND Processes.process_name!=rundll32.exe by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.original_file_name
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 1 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter | search * |
suspicious_rundll32_rename_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Risk Event | False |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Suspicious renamed rundll32.exe binary ran on $dest$ by $user$ | 63 | 70 | 90 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | Not Applicable | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ❌ Failing | N/A | N/A |
N/A |
Integration | ❌ Failing | N/A | N/A |
N/A |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 6