Detection: Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry

Description

The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry entries. It leverages endpoint registry data to identify changes in the registry path "\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\". This activity is significant because adversaries often modify these entries to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\*") BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
4| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) 
5| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
6| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
7| `windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 12 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Sysmon EventID 13 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter search *
windows_defender_exclusion_registry_entry_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools Defense Evasion
T1562 Impair Defenses Defense Evasion
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
Agrius
Aquatic Panda
BRONZE BUTLER
Ember Bear
FIN6
Gamaredon Group
Gorgon Group
INC Ransom
Indrik Spider
Kimsuky
Lazarus Group
Magic Hound
MuddyWater
Play
Putter Panda
Rocke
Saint Bear
TA2541
TA505
TeamTNT
Turla
Wizard Spider
Magic Hound

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known False Positives

admin or user may choose to use this windows features.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Exclusion registry $registry_path$ modified or added on $dest$ for Windows Defender 64 80 80
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 6