Detection: Linux Possible Access To Credential Files

Description

The following analytic detects attempts to access or dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes like 'cat', 'nano', 'vim', and 'vi' accessing these files. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping, a technique used by adversaries to gain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, attackers could obtain hashed passwords for offline cracking, leading to unauthorized access and potential system compromise.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*")  AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/shadow*", "*/etc/passwd*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon for Linux EventID 1 Linux icon Linux 'sysmon:linux' 'Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter search *
linux_possible_access_to_credential_files_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT28
APT32
APT39
Axiom
Ember Bear
Leviathan
Poseidon Group
Sowbug
Suckfly
Tonto Team

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Administrator or network operator can execute this command. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
A commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ 25 50 50
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational sysmon:linux
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational sysmon:linux

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 3