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Description

The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning PowerShell. Typically, this is not common behavior and not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16 (version will vary). PowerShell spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command executed will most likely be encoded and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel processes and identify any files that may have been written.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2023-11-07
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: 42d40a22-9be3-11eb-8f08-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1003.002 Security Account Manager Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="excel.exe" `process_powershell` by Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.user Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name 
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `excel_spawning_powershell_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: excel_spawning_powershell_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.original_file_name
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.parent_process_path
  • Processes.process_path
  • Processes.parent_process_id

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

False positives should be limited, but if any are present, filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2