ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1562.006 | Indicator Blocking | Defense Evasion |
T1562 | Impair Defenses | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Windows Registry Dotnet ETW Disabled Via ENV Variable
Description
The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the COMPlus_ETWEnabled registry value under the "Environment" registry key path for both user (HKCU\Environment) and machine (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment) scopes. This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE Registry.registry_path="*\\Environment*" Registry.registry_value_name="COMPlus_ETWEnabled" (Registry.registry_value_data=0x000000000 OR Registry.registry_value_data=0) BY Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
4| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
5| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
6| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
7| `windows_registry_dotnet_etw_disabled_via_env_variable_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 13 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
windows_registry_dotnet_etw_disabled_via_env_variable_filter | search * |
windows_registry_dotnet_etw_disabled_via_env_variable_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
Known False Positives
Setting the "COMPlus_ETWEnabled" value as a global environment variable either in user or machine scope should only happens during debugging use cases, hence the false positives rate should be very minimal.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
Modified registry entry $registry_path$ in $dest$
Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
---|---|---|---|
dest | system | 90 | No Threat Objects |
user | user | 90 | No Threat Objects |
References
-
https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3
-
https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2