ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1207 | Rogue Domain Controller | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Windows AD Short Lived Domain Controller SPN Attribute
Description
The following analytic detects the temporary addition of a global catalog SPN or a DRS RPC SPN to an Active Directory computer object, indicative of a potential DCShadow attack. This detection leverages EventCode 5136 from the wineventlog_security
data source, focusing on specific SPN attribute changes. This activity is significant as DCShadow attacks allow attackers with privileged access to register rogue Domain Controllers, enabling unauthorized changes to the AD infrastructure. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized replication of changes, including credentials and keys, compromising the entire domain's security.
Search
1`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName=servicePrincipalName (AttributeValue="GC/*" OR AttributeValue="E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/*")
2| stats min(_time) as _time range(_time) as duration values(OperationType) as OperationType values(user) as user values(src_ip) as src_ip values(src_nt_domain) as src_nt_domain values(src_user) as src_user values(Computer) as dest, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN by Logon_ID
3| eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE")
4| where short_lived="TRUE" AND mvcount(OperationType)>1
5| replace "%%14674" with "Value Added", "%%14675" with "Value Deleted" in OperationType
6| rename Logon_ID as TargetLogonId
7| appendpipe [
8| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]
9| stats min(_time) as _time, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN values(OperationType) as OperationType by TargetLogonId src_user dest
10| `windows_ad_short_lived_domain_controller_spn_attribute_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Windows Event Log Security 4624 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
wineventlog_security | eventtype=wineventlog_security OR Channel=security OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Security |
windows_ad_short_lived_domain_controller_spn_attribute_filter | search * |
windows_ad_short_lived_domain_controller_spn_attribute_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcode 5136
. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Directory Services Changes
within DS Access
needs to be enabled, alongside a SACL for everybody
to Write All Properties
applied to the domain root and all descendant objects.
Known False Positives
None.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Short Lived Domain Controller SPN AD Attribute Triggered by $src_user$ | 100 | 100 | 100 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 4