Try in Splunk Security Cloud

Description

The following analytic identifies rundll32.exe loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line. This particular technique will load script code from a file. Upon a successful execution, the following module loads may occur - clr.dll, jscript.dll and scrobj.dll. During investigation, identify script content origination. Generally, a child process will spawn from rundll32.exe, but that may be bypassed based on script code contents. Rundll32.exe is natively found in C:\Windows\system32 and C:\Windows\syswow64. During investigation, review any network connections and obtain the script content executed. It's possible other files are on disk.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2021-02-04
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: 71b9bf37-cde1-45fb-b899-1b0aa6fa1183

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution Defense Evasion
T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


1
2
3
4
5
6



| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*syssetup* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___syssetup_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: detect_rundll32application_control_bypass-_syssetup_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.original_file_name
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.parent_process_path
  • Processes.process_path
  • Processes.parent_process_id

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use syssetup.dll, triggering a false positive.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ loading syssetup.dll by calling the LaunchINFSection function on the command line was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2