Detection: Windows Multiple Disabled Users Failed To Authenticate Wth Kerberos

Description

The following analytic detects a single source endpoint failing to authenticate with 30 unique disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol within 5 minutes. It leverages Windows Security Event 4768, focusing on failure code 0x12, indicating revoked credentials. This activity is significant as it may indicate a Password Spraying attack targeting disabled accounts, a tactic used by adversaries to gain initial access or elevate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment, posing a severe security risk.

1`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!=*$ Status=0x12 
2| bucket span=5m _time 
3| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_accounts values(TargetUserName) as user by _time, IpAddress 
4| where unique_accounts > 30 
5| `windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Windows Event Log Security 4768 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
wineventlog_security eventtype=wineventlog_security OR Channel=security OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Security
windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter search *
windows_multiple_disabled_users_failed_to_authenticate_wth_kerberos_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1110.003 Password Spraying Credential Access
T1110 Brute Force Credential Access
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT28
APT29
APT33
Agrius
Chimera
Ember Bear
HEXANE
Lazarus Group
Leafminer
Silent Librarian
APT28
APT38
APT39
APT41
Agrius
DarkVishnya
Dragonfly
Ember Bear
FIN5
Fox Kitten
HEXANE
OilRig
Turla

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Kerberos Authentication Service within Account Logon needs to be enabled.

Known False Positives

A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Potential Kerberos based password spraying attack from $IpAddress$ 49 70 70
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4