| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access |
Detection: Detect Outlook exe writing a zip file
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of outlook.exe writing a .zip file to the disk.
It leverages data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring process and filesystem activities.
This behavior can be significant as it may indicate the use of Outlook to deliver malicious payloads or exfiltrate data via compressed files.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, or the delivery of malware, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and network.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
7
8Processes.process_name=outlook.exe
9
10by _time span=5m
11 Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
12 Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
13 Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
14 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
15 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
16 Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
17 Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
18 Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
19
20
21| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
22
23| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
24
25| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
26
27
28| rename process_guid as malicious_id
29
30| rename parent_process_id as outlook_id
31
32
33| join malicious_id type=inner
34 [
35
36| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
37 count values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path
38 values(Filesystem.file_name) as file_name
39 FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where
40
41 Filesystem.file_path=*.zip
42 Filesystem.file_path IN ("*:\\Users*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*")
43 Filesystem.action=created
44
45 by _time span=5m
46 Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id
47 Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.dest Filesystem.dvc
48 Filesystem.signature Filesystem.signature_id
49
50
51| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
52
53| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
54
55| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
56
57
58| rename process_guid as malicious_id
59
60
61| fields malicious_id outlook_id dest
62 file_path file_name
63 file_hash count file_id
64 ]
65
66| table firstTime lastTime user malicious_id outlook_id
67 process_name parent_process_name file_name file_path
68 dest action original_file_name parent_process
69 parent_process_name parent_process_exec parent_process_guid
70 parent_process_id parent_process_path process_exec
71 process_guid process_hash process_id process_integrity_level
72 process_name process_path user user_id vendor_product
73
74
75| where file_name != ""
76
77| `detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
| Sysmon EventID 11 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter | search * |
detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
You must be ingesting data that records filesystem and process activity from your hosts to populate the Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon.
Known False Positives
It is not uncommon for outlook to write legitimate zip files to the disk.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
ZIP file - [$file_name$] located in [$file_path$] written by outlook.exe on destination host - [$dest$] by user - [$user$]
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| user | user | 25 | file_name, file_path |
| dest | system | 25 | file_name, file_path |
References
-
https://www.paubox.com/news/hackers-exploit-corrupted-zip-and-office-files-to-bypass-email-security
-
https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/def-000-14w/
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 15