Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution
Description
The following analytic identifies the execution of the native mimikatz.exe binary on Windows systems, including instances where the binary is renamed. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names. This activity is significant because Mimikatz is a widely used tool for extracting authentication credentials, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to obtain sensitive credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-08-15
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: a9e0d6d3-9676-4e26-994d-4e0406bb4467
Annotations
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mimikatz.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=mimikatz.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
False positives should be limited as this is directly looking for Mimikatz, the credential dumping utility.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
100.0 | 100 | 100 | An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting dump credentials. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz
- https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 3