Detection: Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path

Updated Date: 2026-02-03 ID: ac30858b-7c25-4f0a-a7fa-bef036e49dc3 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior.

Search

 1
 2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
 3as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes 
 4where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe)  
 5AND Processes.process = "*.msc*" 
 6AND Processes.process IN (
 7  "*\\PerfLogs\\*",
 8  "*\\programdata\\*"
 9  "*Recycle.bin*",
10  "*\\Download*",
11  "*\\temp\\*",
12  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
13  "*\\Users\\Default\\*",
14  "*\\Users\\Public\\*",
15  "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*",
16  "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", 
17  "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", 
18  "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*"
19  "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*",
20  "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*",
21  "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*",
22  "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*",
23  "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*",
24  )
25AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))
26
27by Processes.action
28Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
29Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
30Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
31Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
32Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
33
34| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
35
36| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
37
38| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
39
40| `windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2	Other	`'crowdstrike:events:sensor'`	`'crowdstrike'`
Sysmon EventID 1	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'`
Windows Event Log Security 4688	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Security'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
security_content_ctime	`convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)`
windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter	`search *`

windows_execution_of_microsoft_msc_file_in_suspicious_path_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1218.014	MMC	Defense Evasion

Exploitation

DE.AE

CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Risk Event	True

This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

A possible false positive (FP) for the execution of .msc files is legitimate administrative activity, since .msc files are standard Microsoft Management Console snap-ins used for system administration.

Associated Analytic Story

XML Runner Loader

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message:

A Microsoft Management Console process [ $process_name$ ] launched an .msc file [ $process$ ] on the target system [ $dest$ ].

Risk Object	Risk Object Type	Risk Score	Threat Objects
dest	system	20	process, process_name, parent_process_name

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 1