Detection: Registry Keys Used For Privilege Escalation

Description

The following analytic detects modifications to registry keys under "Image File Execution Options" that can be used for privilege escalation. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths and values like GlobalFlag and Debugger. This activity is significant because attackers can use these modifications to intercept executable calls and attach malicious binaries to legitimate system binaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to potential system compromise and persistent access.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE ((Registry.registry_path="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name=GlobalFlag OR Registry.registry_value_name=Debugger)) BY Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
4| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) 
5| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
6| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
7| `registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 12 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Sysmon EventID 13 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter search *
registry_keys_used_for_privilege_escalation_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection Persistence
T1546 Event Triggered Execution Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known False Positives

There are many legitimate applications that must execute upon system startup and will use these registry keys to accomplish that task.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
A registry activity in $registry_path$ related to privilege escalation in host $dest$ 76 80 95
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 10