| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1021.003 | Distributed Component Object Model | Lateral Movement |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | Lateral Movement |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Execution |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Execution |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Persistence |
| T1218.014 | MMC | Privilege Escalation |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service | Execution |
Detection: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn
Description
The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions. This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
6
7(
8 Processes.parent_process_name IN (
9 "mmc.exe",
10 "services.exe",
11 "wmiprvse.exe",
12 "wsmprovhost.exe"
13 )
14 OR
15 (
16 Processes.parent_process_name="svchost.exe"
17 ```
18 We exclude the "Schedule" service from the svchost.exe process. But since there are instances where its not hosted in a dedicated svchost process, we need to the hosting group "netsvcs" too
19 ```
20 NOT Processes.parent_process IN (
21 "*-k netsvcs*",
22 "*-s Schedule*",
23 )
24 )
25)
26AND
27(
28 Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
29 OR
30 (
31 Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
32 Processes.process IN (
33 "*powershell*",
34 "*pwsh*"
35 )
36 )
37)
38NOT Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\CCM\\*")
39
40by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
41 Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
42 Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
43 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
44 Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
45 Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
46 Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
47 Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
48
49
50| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
51
52| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
53
54| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
55
56| `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`
Data Source
| Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | Other | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
| Sysmon EventID 1 | 'XmlWinEventLog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
| possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter | search * |
possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Disabled | true |
| Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time | -70m@m |
| Latest Time | -10m@m |
| Schedule Window | auto |
| Creates Notable | Yes |
| Rule Title | %name% |
| Rule Description | %description% |
| Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
| Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
False positives are expected from legitimate use of WMI or certain services. Apply additoinal filters as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$
| Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| dest | system | 50 | process, process_name, parent_process_name |
References
Detection Testing
| Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 14