Try in Splunk Security Cloud

Description

This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via jump (Cobalt Strike PTH) or getsystem, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2023-07-10
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution
T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence, Privilege Escalation
T1543 Create or Modify System Process Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Kill Chain Phase
  • Installation
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


1
2
3
4
5
6



| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.original_file_name
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.parent_process_path
  • Processes.process_path
  • Processes.parent_process_id

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
64.0 80 80 An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2