This search is to detect a suspicious rundll32 commandline to lock the workstation through command line. This technique was seen in CONTI leak tooling and script as part of its defense evasion. This technique is not a common practice to lock a screen and maybe a good indicator of compromise.
- Type: Anomaly
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2021-08-09
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: fa90f372-f91d-11eb-816c-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 6 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe Processes.process= "*user32.dll,LockWorkStation*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `rundll32_lockworkstation_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
rundll32_lockworkstation_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Supported Add-on (TA)
List of Splunk Add-on’s tested to work with the analytic.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
Known False Positives
Associated Analytic Story
|25.0||50||50||process $process_name$ with cmdline $process$ in host $dest$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 2