Detection: W3WP Spawning Shell

Description

The following analytic identifies instances where a shell (PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe) is spawned from W3WP.exe, the IIS worker process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is W3WP.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate webshell activity, often associated with exploitation attempts like those by the HAFNIUM Group on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.

Search

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=w3wp.exe AND `process_cmd` OR `process_powershell` by Processes.dest Processes.parent_process Processes.original_file_name Processes.user 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `w3wp_spawning_shell_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2	N/A	'crowdstrike:events:sensor'	'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Baseline your environment before production. It is possible build systems using IIS will spawn cmd.exe to perform a software build. Filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

• BlackByte Ransomware

• CISA AA22-257A

• CISA AA22-264A

• Data Destruction

• Flax Typhoon

• HAFNIUM Group

• Hermetic Wiper

• ProxyNotShell

• ProxyShell

• WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

References

• https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/02/04/ghost-in-the-shell-investigating-web-shell-attacks/

• https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/17/from-pwn2own-2021-a-new-attack-surface-on-microsoft-exchange-proxyshell

• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC6iHw258RI

• https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-microsoft-exchange-servers-still-vulnerable-to-proxyshell-exploit#what-should-you-do

Detection Testing

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 4