Detection: Suspicious Process File Path

Description

The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths not typically associated with legitimate software. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process paths within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because adversaries often use unconventional file paths to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, leading to unauthorized software execution, potential system compromise, and further malicious activities within the environment.

Search

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\fonts\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\users\\public\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\windows\\debug\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\servicing\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Users\\Default\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*Recycle.bin*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\Windows\\Media\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "\\Windows\\repair\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\temp\\*" OR Processes.process_path = "*\\PerfLogs\\*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.user 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `suspicious_process_file_path_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2	N/A	'crowdstrike:events:sensor'	'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in non-standard paths. Filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

• AgentTesla

• Amadey

• AsyncRAT

• Azorult

• BlackByte Ransomware

• Brute Ratel C4

• CISA AA23-347A

• Chaos Ransomware

• DarkCrystal RAT

• DarkGate Malware

• Data Destruction

• Double Zero Destructor

• Graceful Wipe Out Attack

• Handala Wiper

• Hermetic Wiper

• IcedID

• Industroyer2

• LockBit Ransomware

• MoonPeak

• Phemedrone Stealer

• PlugX

• Prestige Ransomware

• Qakbot

• RedLine Stealer

• Remcos

• Rhysida Ransomware

• Swift Slicer

• Trickbot

• ValleyRAT

• Volt Typhoon

• Warzone RAT

• WhisperGate

• XMRig

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

References

• https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/

• https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/

• https://twitter.com/pr0xylife/status/1590394227758104576

• https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat

• https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/

Detection Testing

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 4